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Abstract: We study a large economy in which firms cannot compute exact solutions
to the non-linear equations that characterize the equilibrium price at which they can sell
future output. Instead, firms use polynomial expansions to approximate prices. The preci-
sion with which they can compute prices is endogenous and depends on the overall level of
supply. At the same time, firms’ individual supplies, and thus aggregate supply, depend on
the precision with which they approximate prices. This interrelation between supply and
price forecast induces multiple equilibria, with inefficiently low output, in economies that
otherwise have a unique, efficient equilibrium. Moreover, exogenous parameter changes,
which would increase output were there no computational frictions, can diminish agents’
ability to approximate future prices, and reduce output. Our model therefore accommo-
dates the intuition that interventions, such as unprecedented quantitative easing, can put
agents into “uncharted territory”.
Keywords: Polynomial Inference, Self-Referential Equilibria, Glitch Equilibria
1 Introduction
Few people would claim that they are able to compute future equilibrium outcomes, such
as prices, with any accuracy. Despite this, textbook models implicitly assume that, given
all relevant data, agents compute exact numeric values for future equilibrium prices, re-
spectively, the entire distribution of these prices if the model involves risk. In this paper,
we assume that economic agents are computationally constrained to the use of polynomial
functions. That is, instead of being able to solve arbitrary non-linear problems, they rely
1I am particularly indebted to Martin Hellwig for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
I also thank Dominik Grafenhofer, Sebastian Klein, Harvey Lapan, and Carl Christian von Weizsa¨cker
for discussions on equilibrium models. Finally, I received helpful questions and comments from seminar
participants in Bonn. First draft July 2015.
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on polynomial expansions to approximate future equilibrium outcomes. Put differently,
agents act just like economic researchers who use polynomials, such as the Arrow-Pratt
approximation, to restate complicated non-linear problems in terms of workable polyno-
mials.
Using a two-period model, in which firms employ polynomial approximations to infer
future selling prices for their output, we find that multiple equilibria emerge in well-
behaved economies that would have a unique, efficient equilibrium if agents could compute
future equilibria with perfect accuracy. Moreover, exogenous parameter changes, which
would increase economic activity were agents computationally unconstrained, can reduce
economic activity as they make it harder for agents to approximate equilibrium prices.
Our results rely on the fact that there are levels of supply where a polynomial ap-
proximation to the function, which relates equilibrium supply to equilibrium price, is of
good quality, and other levels where it is of low quality. Put differently, a firm’s ability to
compute equilibrium prices changes with the level of aggregate supply. At the same time,
individual supply, and thus aggregate supply, varies with the precision with which agents
can predict prices. This interaction gives rise to two coexisting types of equilibria. In the
first, economic activity falls into intervals where agents’ polynomial approximations are of
high quality and the role of the computational friction is small. These equilibria can coin-
cide with the rational expectations equilibrium (REE). In the second type, computational
frictions are important and agents find it difficult to predict prices: Aggregate supply is (i)
low and (ii) falls into an interval where agents’ approximations, to the equation describing
equilibrium, are of poor quality.
In one interpretation, we may think of a farmer who must decide in spring how much
corn he should plant. This farmer may know the price at which corn tends to sell in
years with “normal” supply. Moreover, he might know that small increases in aggregate
supply tend to reduce prices, i.e, that demand is locally downward sloping. Finally, he
may know that this downward slope tapers off as supply increases. The farmer, however,
is unable to calculate all numeric values that the demand function takes over its entire
domain. If he wants to calculate those prices, which obtain once supply differs from
those levels that he is familiar with, he must use a polynomial expansion to extrapolate
the new price. In a macroeconomic interpretation, we think of a large number of firms
that have to choose production today in anticipation of future demand. These firms
know the price at which their goods sell in “normal times”. However, if firms collectively
cut production today, it will be difficult for them to know whether future selling prices
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increase, due to reduced supply, or fall, since the layoffs, associated with production cuts,
reduce demand.2 This intuition extends naturally to economies where demand concerns
a vector of goods, which may involve substitutes and complements. In such a setting it
appears even more natural to assume that firms cannot solve for the overall equilibrium.
Instead, a firm, which produces a particular good, may, if it is exceptionally well informed,
use the economy’s Jacobian matrix to compute demand for its particular good in terms
of a first-order polynomial approximation.
Regarding parameter changes, the uncertainty that agents face in our model does not
originate from a world with stochastically changing parameters. Instead, agents know the
magnitude of the parameter change in advance; the difficulty is to predict its consequences.
As an illustration, we refer to two representative comments made on the quantitative
easing program: Stanley Druckenmiller, an accomplished investor with a thirty-year track
record, commented in retrospect “I didn’t know how it was going to end... I would
have said inflation [which] would have been dead wrong.”3 Similarly, taking an ex-ante
perspective, Joseph Stiglitz predicted that QE2 would likely bring interest rates down “a
little”, but that it was unclear what the risks, ranging from economic growth to“a whole
set of other potential risks that - may result from this policy”4, were.5 Likewise, there
appears to be no consensus among observers how, if at all, a UK exit from the EU will
affect the economies of the UK and the remainder EU. Similar arguments apply to more
long-term problems such as the demographic transition.6 As we show, agents’ inability
to perform comparative statics alters model predictions considerably: Large parameter
changes, which would unambiguously increase output if agents could compute the model’s
2Diamond (1982), and Cooper and John (1988), develop models where search frictions result in
upward-sloping aggregate demand functions. See Hellwig (1993) for a review of models with non-
monotonic demand. More generally, such effects are important in economies where Say’s law, stating
that supply creates its own demand, is of relevance. See also Chamley (2014) for a related model of
savings and investment.
3Speech given at the 2015 Dealbook conference.
4Interview given on the Charlie Rose show on 3 November 2010.
5See Soros (1994) for case studies highlighting market participants’ difficulties to anticipate the im-
pact that pre-announced central bank policies have on macroeconomic equilibrium variables. Similarly,
Niederhoffer (1997), p. 381, concludes his discussion on excess demand functions: “The difficulty is that
nobody knows what the equilibrium level is until at least the morning after the fact.”
6That is, we know from birth statistics that cohorts entering the labor market will be smaller and
cohorts entering retirement will grow. At the same time, it proves difficult to predict how such changes
impact future growth paths.
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comparative statics correctly, can reduce output. The model therefore accommodates the
intuition that interventions, such as unprecedented quantitative easing, can put agents
into “uncharted territory”, i.e., diminish agent’s ability to forecast relevant equilibrium
variables. Hence, even though markets work inefficiently, the government’s ability to
improve market outcomes is limited.
Related Literature: Due to their bounded computational capacity, agents work with
an approximate, misspecified model. Except for special cases, they cannot form rational
expectations in the sense of Hutchison (1937), Grunberg and Modigliani (1954), Muth
(1961), Blanchard (1979) and DeCanio (1979), which are consistent with the true model.
Regarding model misspecification, our approach is thus akin to the literature on learning,
Bray (1982), Marcet and Sargent (1989), and Sargent (1993), where agents use a misspec-
ified least squares approach to infer unknown model parameters. Rothschild (1974) and
McLennan (1984) model firms that experiment with different supply functions to learn
about stochastic demand. Firms in our model are small, and thus changing individual
supply has no influence on prices. That is, in the dynamic extension of our model, the
information that firms learn over time is determined by overall equilibrium rather than
individual experimentation.
We interpret our baseline model as a simple AD, AS setting, as in Keynes (1936) and
Samuelson (2009), which is augmented with a computational friction. In Section 4, we
show that our model may be reinterpreted as a Diamond (1982) and Cooper and John
(1988) aggregate search model, where the probability of finding a trading partner de-
pends on the equilibrium level of economic activity. In this interpretation, agents’ com-
putational constraint makes it difficult for them to compute the equilibrium probability
of finding a trading partner. Regarding government intervention, Diamond (1982) and
Cooper and John (1988) find positive multipliers, which are due to the search friction.
In the current model, where the search friction is coupled with a computational friction,
government intervention has a non-monotonous effect on output.
Tesfatsion (2006), Gintis (2007), Farmer and Foley (2009), and Thurner et al. (2012)
argue for “agent-based” models in which agents follow decision rules that do not neces-
sarily coincide with rational behavior.7 In the current paper, agents are computationally
7One argument for such a departure is computational complexity: Rubinstein (1998), Maymin (2011)
and Ackerman et al. (2011) emphasize that agents might be constraint in their ability to count or to
compute conditional probabilities. Nelson and Winter (1985), Ulanowicz (2008), Hofbauer and Sandholm
(2011), Arthur (2015), and Kuhle (2016) for evolutionary models where biases emerge endogenously.
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constrained to the use of polynomial expansions. This case is of special interest since
researchers in economics, physics, and engineering indeed rely on first- and second-order
polynomial expansions, rather than exact solutions, to understand non-linear problems;
equilibrium comparative statics of a well behaved model, y = f(y; b), are commonly eval-
uated in terms of a first-order polynomial expansion ∆y ≈ ∆yfy + ∆bfb, which yields
∆y
∆b
≈
fb
1−fy
, respectively, ∂y
∂b
= fb
1−fy
.8Hence, we argue that the current model is method-
ologically consistent in the sense that the outside researcher, i.e., the paper’s reader, will
use the same method of analysis that is used by the model’s agents.
Section 2 abstracts from computational frictions and identifies the unique rational
expectations equilibrium. Section 2.1 studies equilibria that obtain with computationally
constrained agents. Section 2.2 considers the impact of exogenous parameter changes.
Section 3.1 studies the economy’s convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium in
a dynamic setting, where firms accumulate empirical knowledge. Section 3.2 introduces
asymmetric information. In Section 4, we suggest different interpretations of our baseline
model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We study a large economy in which a mass one of firms i ∈ [0, 1] produce a homogenous
good. There are two periods of time. In the first period, each firm chooses to produce
a quantity of goods ai in anticipation of a future selling price Pˆ . In the second period,
firms sell the finished products ai inelastically to consumers at a market clearing price
P . For simplicity, to ensure uniqueness of the REE in the economy without computa-
tional friction, we assume that aggregate demand is twice continuously differentiable and
8Similarly, Mas-Colell et al. (1995), pp. 599-641, use first-order polynomial expansions to examine
non-linear demand in pure exchange economies with many commodities. As mentioned earlier, Finetti
(1952), Arrow (1970), Pratt (1964) use second-order expansions to study expected utility. Likewise, the
familiar first- and second-order conditions, f ′(x0) = 0 and f
′′(x0) < 0, for a smooth function f(x) to have
local maximum at point x0, stem from an expansion f(x) = f(x0)+f
′(x0)(x−x0)+ 12f ′′(x0)(x−x0)2+O3;
see Chiang and Wainwright (2005), pp. 250-253, or Samuelson (1947), pp. 357-379. Related, the stability
of differential and difference equations, Samuelson (1947), pp. 21-121, 257-349, and 380-439, or Galor
(2007). Finally, DeCanio (1979), p. 52, points out that solving expectations equilibria requires either
that the model is assumed to be linear, or that the model’s equations have to be linearized, i.e., rewritten
in terms of a first-order polynomial, which is what our agents do.
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monotonously downward-sloping in goods quantity A:
P = φ(A), φA < 0, φAA ≷ 0, φ(0) > 0. (1)
Demand (1) represents the model’s non-linearity, respectively, the computational obstacle
that agents have to overcome. In Section 4, we suggest three different interpretations of φ()
by showing that it captures the non-linearities that individual agents face when they make
forward-looking decisions in the standard workhorse models of Diamond (1965), Diamond
(1982), and the AD, AS model of Samuelson (2009). That is, φ may be interpreted as (i)
future returns to savings, (ii) the probability of finding a trading partner, or (iii) the
selling price for output.
Firm i chooses a production schedule a∗i to maximize expected profits
a∗i = argmax
ai
{
pii = aiPˆ − 1
2
a2i
}
, ai ≥ 0,
where Pˆ is the firm’s expectation regarding the selling price and 1
2
a2i is a quadratic cost
function. Hence, agent i supplies
a∗i = Pˆ
and aggregate supply is
A =
∫
[0,1]
a∗idi = Pˆ . (2)
If agents are computationally unconstrained, they can compute demand (1) over its entire
domain. That is, for each level of aggregate supply A, they form rational price expecta-
tions Pˆ = φ(A). In turn, they combine (1) and (2) to calculate the unique equilibrium
quantity A0:
A0 = φ(A0), (3)
and, using (1), they compute equilibrium price P0:
P0 = φ(A0). (4)
Accordingly, we have
Lemma 1. There exists a unique, rational expectations equilibrium {A0, P0} ∈ R2+. In
this equilibrium agents forecast prices correctly Pˆ = P0.
Proof. Market clearing (3)-(4) determines equilibrium quantity A0 > 0, which is unique
since φ(0) > 0 and φA < 0. Using (1), the equilibrium price is P0 = φ(A0) = A0 > 0.
Finally, (2) indicates that Pˆ = A0 and thus Pˆ = P0.
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2.1 Polynomial Equilibria
We now assume that firms cannot compute demand over its entire domain. Instead, they
are familiar with a point on the demand function, A∗, φ(A∗), and the demand function’s
slope φA(A
∗) at this point. It is convenient to start with the assumption that this point
is the REE of Lemma 1, i.e, agents know A0, φ(A0), and the slope φA(A0). In turn, once
supply differs from A0, agents use polynomial expansions to extrapolate demand to esti-
mate the resulting price. Polynomial equilibrium points will be those points where the
polynomial, which mimics true demand, intersects with supply. Put differently, “poly-
nomial equilibria” are those points that solve the agents’ approximate model. The REE
from the previous section will be one, but not the only, such equilibrium.
Expanding demand (1) around the perfect foresight equilibrium, agents forecast the
selling price (1) as:
Pˆ = φ(A0) + φA(A0)∆A, ∆A = A−A0. (5)
Equation (5) reflects that agents cannot numerically compute the true price P = φ(A0 +
∆A) at which a supply A = A0 + ∆A sells. The reliability of estimate (5) decreases the
more aggregate supply A differs from A0.
9 We assume that agents choose output ai to
maximize:
a∗i = argmax
ai
{
pi = aiPˆ − 1
2
a2i − aiτ∆A2
}
, τ ≥ 0. (6)
The profit criterion (6) allows for two interpretations. In the first, aiPˆ − 12a2i is the firm’s
profit given the price estimate Pˆ , and −aiτ∆A2 reflects that firms, knowing their estimate
is based on a first-order expansion, which neglects second-order terms, discount τ > 0
the estimated revenue. In a second interpretation, which we elaborate on in Proposition
2 of Appendix A, −τ represents the demand function’s second derivative φAA. In this
case agents do not discount their price estimate, and rely on a second-order Taylor-series
expansions to estimate the selling price.10
9Note that the model’s coefficients throughout can be chosen such that the equilibrium deviation ∆A
is arbitrarily small, respectively, such that the approximation (5) is of arbitrarily good quality.
10That is, if agents knew demand’s second derivative, their price estimate (5) would write Pˆ =
φ(A0) + φA∆A +
1
2
φAA∆A
2. Substituting this into (6), and setting the discount rate τ = 0, yields
a∗i = argmax
ai
{
ai(φ(A0) + φA∆A +
1
2
φAA∆A
2) − 1
2
a2i
}
. Comparison indicates that the new profit cri-
terion is equivalent to the old, (6), except for the second-order derivative 1
2
φAA taking the place of the
discount rate −τ .
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From (6), we obtain individual and aggregate supply:
a∗i = Pˆ − τ∆A2, A =
∫
i∈[0,1]
aidi = Pˆ − τ∆A2. (7)
Combining supply (7) and estimated demand (5), the equilibrium quantity A, where
supply intersects with the demand estimate, is the solution to:
A = φ(A0) + φA(A0)∆A− τ∆A2. (8)
For convenience, we identify equilibria j = 0, 1, 2..., in terms of their distance ∆Aj =
Aj − A0 to the rational expectations equilibrium A0. That is, ∆Aj = 0 corresponds to
the REE. Using the fact that A0 = φ(A0), we rewrite (8) as:
τ∆A2 + (1− φA)∆A = 0,
and note:
Proposition 1. There exists the rational expectations equilibrium ∆A0 = A0 − A0 = 0
in which agents’ price forecasts are correct Pˆ = P0. There exists a second equilibrium
∆A1 = A1 −A0 = − (1−φA)τ < 0 in which Pˆ1 T P1.
Both equilibria in Proposition 1 are self-fulfilling. In the perfect foresight equilibrium,
no firm deviates from the equilibrium supply A = A0, and thus there is no need for agents
to rely on polynomial approximations: Producers know the price φ(A0). The opposite
is the case in the second equilibrium: Once firms supply A1 6= A0, they are uncertain
as to the equilibrium price, φ(A1) = φ(A0 + ∆A1), which they can only approximate as
φ(A0) + φA(A0)∆A. Moreover, the error of this approximation, (A − A0)2, grows the
more agents deviate from supplying A0. That is, once firms deviate from the rational
expectations equilibrium, they find it harder to estimate future prices and thus they are
incentivised to deviate even further until a new equilibrium is reached. In this equilibrium,
firms cannot forecast prices accurately, and thus they choose to produce a small number
of goods, at a low marginal cost, which provides a margin of safety.
As we argued earlier, this interdependence between aggregate output and the individ-
ual firm’s ability to understand the environment that it operates in is a crucial aspect in
most crises: Once consumers and investors change their behavior, they find themselves
in an environment that is hard to understand, and they hold back on investment and
consumption decisions waiting for the “dust to settle”. In the current interpretation,
by cutting production, agents put themselves into “uncharted territory”. This aspect
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is, by assumption, not captured in environments where agents can compute the entire
demand function, respectively, solve the model as in Lemma 1. Before we discuss the
scope for government to correct such “glitches” in output, which turns out to be lim-
ited, we make one remark: The model’s coefficients φA(A0), τ can be chosen such that
∆A1 = A1−A0 = − (1−φA)τ < 0 is arbitrarily small. That is, both equilibria in Proposition
1 exist even if the the first-order Taylor-series approximation (5) is of very good quality,
i.e., if the error term is of order O(∆A2).
2.2 Parameter Changes
We augment demand P = φ(A; b) to incorporate an exogenous parameter b. This pa-
rameter is assumed to increase demand φb = φb(A; b) > 0 for every A. This parameter
may be seen as government demand or money supply.11 In this interpretation, the fol-
lowing section identifies the multiplier effect that obtains once agents need to rely on
approximations to anticipate the consequences of policy interventions.
We begin with a benchmark model where agents are computationally unconstrained.
Second, we study the model with friction. Comparing both settings shows that parameter
increases, which increase demand and equilibrium output in a model with unconstrained
agents, can reduce economic activity if firms are computationally constrained. Put differ-
ently, parameter changes, in particular if they are large, can put agents into “uncharted
territory”, and incentivise them to cut, rather than increase, output.
2.2.1 Comparative statics without friction
Recalling our augmented demand function:
P = φ(A; b0), φA < 0, φAA ≷ 0, φb > 0, φ(0; b) > 0, (9)
firms can anticipate the equilibrium price P correctly, if they are computationally uncon-
strained as in Lemma 1. Hence, they choose a production schedule a∗i which maximizes
profits a∗i = argmax
ai
{
pii = aiP − 12a2i
}
. Aggregate supply is thus
A =
∫
[0,1]
a∗idi = P. (10)
11Alternatively, as we discuss in Section 4, the model may be interpreted as the capital market of
an overlapping generations economy, where ai, A, φ() are, respectively, individual savings and aggregate
savings, and φ(A) is the marginal product of capital that agents expect to receive on their savings. Finally,
b may be seen as public debt and A0 as steady state capital.
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Taken together (9) and (10) yield a unique equilibrium P0, A0 for every given exogenous
parameter b0. Once the parameter changes from b0 to b1 = b0 + ∆b, the price is again
correctly anticipated as the unique solution P1, A1 to the equations P = A and P =
φ(A; b0 +∆b).
How would an actual human being, or an economic researcher, try to think about the
impact of the parameter change? The outside researcher, who uses textbook methods to
study how changes in the exogenous parameter from b0 to b1 change output and price,
cannot compute A and P explicitly. Instead, he will approximate the model’s comparative
statics. That is, he will differentiate (9) and (10):
∆P ≈ φA(A0; b0)∆A + φb(A0; b0)∆b, ∆A = A−A0, ∆b = b1 − b0, (11)
∆A = ∆P. (12)
Combining (11) and (12) yields the model’s comparative statics:
Lemma 2. Exogenous parameter variations ∆b change output (and price) according to
∆A
∆b
≈ φb
1−φA
> 0 and ∂A
∂b
= lim
∆b→0
∆A
∆b
= φb
1−φA
> 0.
That is, an outside observer/analyst would use a polynomial expansion of A = φ(A; b), P =
φ(A; b) to approximate the impact of an exogenous parameter change as in Lemma 2. In
the following section, we assume that firms themselves make such “polynomial inference”
using such an approximation to anticipate the consequences of parameter changes.
2.2.2 Comparative statics with computationally constrained agents
Using a first-order expansion, around A0 = φ(A0; b0), agents approximate the equilibrium
price:
Pˆ = φ0(A0, b0) + φA∆A+ φb∆b, ∆A = A− A0, ∆b = b1 − b0. (13)
That is, agents have to incorporate two aspects in their demand forecast: (i) the direct
effect of the parameter change ∆b and (ii) the equilibrium response of all agents who
deviate ∆A 6= 0 from their usual supply choice. As before, agents discount the price
estimate since they do not know how curvature terms of demand φAA, φbb, and φAb affect
10
prices:12
pii = aiPˆ − ai(τ1∆A2 + τ2∆b2 + τ3|∆A||∆b|)− 1
2
a2i
a∗i = Pˆ − τ1∆A2 − τ2∆b2 − τ3|∆A||∆b| τi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3. (14)
To find the equilibria associated with (13) and (14), it is useful to distinguish cases
where ∆A ≥ 0 from cases where ∆A ≤ 0.
We begin by looking for equilibria where ∆A ≥ 0,∆b ≥ 0. If ∆A ≥ 0 and ∆b ≥ 0
then supply equals approximate demand (14), when:
A = φ0(A0, b0) + φA∆A + φb∆b− τ1∆A2 − τ2∆b2 − τ3∆A∆b,
and thus:
∆A1,2 = −1− φA + τ3∆b
2τ1
±
√
(φb − τ2∆b) 1
τ1
∆b+
(1− φA + τ3∆b
2τ1
)2
. (15)
Combining the two equilibrium candidates in (15) with our initial assumption ∆A ≥ 0,
we have:
Lemma 3. If and only if ∆b < φb
τ2
, there exists an equilibrium in which, compared to the
perfect foresight equilibrium, production (and price) are increased:
∆A1 = −1−φA+τ3∆b2τ1 +
√
(φb − τ2∆b) 1τ1∆b+
(
1−φA+τ3∆b
2τ1
)2
> 0. At the margin, increases
in the parameter increase income if ∂∆A
∂∆b
= − τ3
2τ1
+ 1/2
φb
1
τ1
−2
τ2
τ1
∆b+2
τ3
τ1
(
1−φA+τ3∆b
2τ1
)
√
(φb−τ2∆b)
1
τ1
∆b+
(
1−φA+τ3∆b
2τ1
)2 > 0.
Proof. Follows directly from (15).
To interpret the equilibrium in Lemma 3, we study how it corresponds to the REE
of Proposition 1. That is, we note that lim
∆b→0
∆A1(∆b) = 0, i.e., the equilibrium quantity
A1 converges to the REE quantity A0 as b → b0. On the contrary, for large changes
∆b > 0, the equilibrium loses its RE character as agents do not precisely know how
demand is impacted by the exogenous change. Such large parameter changes have an
ambiguous effect on output, which is captured by the term (φb − τ2∆b)∆b. On the
one hand, agents extrapolate the increase in demand φb∆b > 0. At the same time,
agents cannot rule out that too large an increase might eventually prove counterproductive
12In Appendix B we discuss an alternative error term max[∆A2,∆b2,∆A∆b], where agents are either
concerned about miscalculating the parameter change’s impact, ∆b > ∆A, or the other agents’ reaction
∆A > ∆b to the parameter change.
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−τ2∆b2. That is, large, unprecedented changes in the model’s structure render agents’
polynomial approximations unreliable, and put them into “uncharted territory”.
Lemma 3 thus features four policy regimes. First, if the parameter change is (in-
finitesimally) small, the agents’ polynomial approximations are of high quality. In this
regime, policy is as effective as in the model of Section 2.2.1, Lemma 2, where agents are
computationally unconstrained. That is, the model’s multiplier is given by ∂∆A
∂∆b |∆b=0
=
∂A
∂b
= φb
1−φA
> 0. Second, there is an intermediate region where ∆b ∈ [0,∆b1], and policy
changes have a positive effect at the margin, ∂∆A
∂∆b
> 0. These marginal returns, however,
are diminishing. Third, there is a region ∆b ∈ [∆b1,∆b2] where agents find themselves in
“uncharted territory” and start to cut production ∂∆A
∂∆b
< 0. Finally, in the extreme case
where ∆b ≥ φb
τ2
, an equilibrium ∆A > 0 cannot exist.
Regarding the remaining equilibria, where ∆A ≤ 0, we recall (13) and (14), and note
that −|∆A| = ∆A. Accordingly, there are two candidates
∆A2,3 = −1− φA − τ3∆b
2τ1
±
√
(φb − τ2∆b) 1
τ1
∆b+
(1− φA − τ3∆b
2τ1
)2
. (16)
In view of (16), if ∆b < φb
τ2
, there exists exactly one equilibrium, in which ∆A2 =
−1−φA−τ3∆b
2τ1
−
√
(φb − τ2∆b) 1τ1∆b+
(
1−φA−τ3∆b
2τ1
)2
< 0 such that economic activity is lower
than in the REE. For large parameter changes, ∆b > φb
τ2
, there can exist up to two equi-
libria in which economic activity is low. Combining these observations with Lemma 3
yields:
Corollary 1. Large parameter changes ∆b > φb
τ2
preclude the existence of equilibria with
output A ≥ A0.
3 Extensions
So far agents were assumed to know the rational expectations equilibrium A0, φ(A0).
In Section 3.1, we study a dynamic setting where agents learn different points on the
demand curve over time. In turn, we examine how the economy converges to the REE.
Second, in our baseline setting, all agents know the same point on the demand curve.
Price forecasts and supply decisions are therefore the same across agents. Once different
agents know different pieces of the demand curve, this is no longer true. Rather than
knowing each other’s price forecasts and supplies, agents have to estimate price and supply
12
simultaneously. In Section 3.2, we extend our model to incorporate such asymmetric
information in a manner which is akin to Bayesian inference.
3.1 Learning
We abstracted from the fact that agents may learn from past mistakes, i.e., suboptimal
production choices that were based on incorrect price estimates. One would imagine that
they memorize these mistakes, or the observation that a quantity A1 is associated with
an observable price P1 = φ(A1). Under our current assumptions on the demand function,
this price differs from the estimated price Pˆ1. Hence, agents would not supply A1 again.
Second, if agents are computationally constrained to the use of polynomials, how do they
find the perfect foresight equilibrium in the first place? This section’s main observation
is that agents will learn the REE over time.
Agents who sell repeatedly into the market will, over time t = 0, 1, 2, 3..., observe an
increasing number of points on the demand curve. Regarding these points, Pt = φ(At),
we assume that agents also learn demand’s slope φA(At) once a quantity At is marketed.
Given past observations At, t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., T agents can refine their price estimate as:
PˆT+1 = φ(A
∗) + φA(A
∗)(AT+1 − A∗), A∗ = argmin
At
{
|AT+1 −At|
}
t = 0, 1, 2, 3...T(17)
That is, to estimate prices, they select from the set of known points {At}Tt=0 the point
A∗, which is closest to the future supply AT+1. Put differently, they use the observation
A∗ from the past, which is most similar/closest to the situation they are trying to make
inference on. In turn, agents i choose supply
ai = PˆT+1 − (AT+1 −A∗)2. (18)
Hence, for a given A∗, there are two equilibrium candidates
AT+1 = A
∗ − 1− φA(A
∗)
2
±
√
(φ(A∗)− A∗) +
(1− φA(A∗)
2
)2
. (19)
To show that (17) and (19) ensure that agents learn the REE equilibrium A0, φ(A0), we
proceed in two steps. First, we study the case where demand φ() is a convex function. In
this case, convergence to the REE can be studied in terms of a simple first-order difference
equation. Second, for the remaining cases, we give an indirect argument in Appendix C.
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3.1.1 Convex Demand
Without loss of generality, we assume that agents start with a prior µ, φ(µ), µ < A0.
Moreover, we focus on the “+” roots of (19). For convex demand, we now show that (17)
and (19) imply a first-order difference equation for supply:
AT+1 = AT − 1− φA(AT )
2
+
√
(φ(AT )− AT ) +
(1− φA(AT )
2
)2
. (20)
First, we note that (20) indicates that agents, in Marshallian fashion, increase supply, such
that AT+1 > AT , if the marginal revenue φ(AT ) exceeds the marginal cost of production
AT . Moreover, from Lemma 1, we know that there exists only one level of supply, namely
A0, where A = φ(A). It follows that (20) has a unique steady state at the point where
AT+1 = AT = A0. This steady state equilibrium is stable due to our assumption that φ
is downward-sloping: For AT < A0, we have φ(AT ) − AT > 0 and thus AT+1 > AT . At
A0, the system is locally stable since
∂AT
∂AT+1
=|AT=A0 0 ∈ (−1, 1). To complete the argu-
ment, we note that the sequence {At}Tt=1 is strictly increasing, and, due to our convexity
assumption on φ, that At ≤ A0∀t = 0, 1, 2....T .13 That is, AT always adjusts towards,
but not beyond, A0. Hence, according to (17), agents will always use the information
that they learned in the previous period, when a quantity AT was marketed, to think
about AT+1. This last property allows us to study convergence in terms of the first-order
difference equation (20).
3.2 Asymmetric Information
One may suspect that heterogeneity in information might mitigate the possibility of multi-
ple equilibria that we emphasize.14 Moreover, one might expect that dispersion of private
information induces some agents to supply too little and others too much such that, on
average, errors cancel and supply might actually be at an efficient level.15 Regarding
13To see this, recall (17) and (18), which imply AT+1 = φ(AT )+φA(AT )(AT+1−AT )−(AT+1−AT )2 ≤
φ(AT ) + φA(AT )(AT+1 − AT ). At the same time, convexity of φ implies: φ(AT+1) = φ(AT + AT+1 −
AT ) ≥ φ(AT ) + φA(AT )(AT+1 −AT ). Taking both inequalities together, we have AT+1 − φ(AT+1) ≤ 0,
respectively, AT+1 ≤ A0. Where AT+1 ≤ A0, follows from φ being downward-sloping and A = φ(A)
at A = A0. Hence, if we start at a point µ − φ(µ) < 0, this implies that AT+1 ≤ A0∀T . Finally, as
mentioned before, if demand is non-convex, At can overshoot A0. In that case we require an additional
argument, which we give in Appendix C.
14See, e.g., Morris and Shin (1998) for a coordination problem where asymmetric information selects
unique equilibria in an economy with a continuum of players.
15See Galton (1907), and Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) for such wisdom of the crowd effects.
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these conjectures, we find that (i) multiplicity carries over to the case with dispersed pri-
vate information and (ii) that dispersed information tends to amplify (dampen) supply if
demand is concave (convex).
Each agent i ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to know the selling price φ(Ai) and demand’s first
derivative φA(Ai) of a particular supply Ai ∈ [0,∞]. Agents are distributed over these
points according to an integrable density function f(). For simplicity, we normalize agents’
discount rate to τ = 1.
Conditional on information Ai, φ(Ai), φA(Ai) agent i supplies:
a∗i |Ai = Pˆ |Ai − (Aˆ|Ai − Ai)2, (21)
where Pˆ |Ai and Aˆ|Ai are agent i′s price and supply forecasts conditional on knowing
demand φ(Ai) at point Ai. The polynomial estimates for price and quantity are:
Pˆ |Ai = φ(Ai) + φA(Ai)(Aˆ|Ai −Ai), (22)
and
Aˆ|Ai =
∫
[0,1]
(aj |Aj)|Aidj. (23)
Where (23) reflects that agent i uses his information at point Ai to infer the information
and thus the supply of the other agents who know a different point Aj . That is, agent
i knows that agent j observes a point on the same demand curve and thus he uses a
polynomial expansion around φ(Ai) to estimate the information φ(Aj), φA(Aj) that player
j receives. Based on this reasoning, i can construct an estimate for the other players’
price estimates, which he needs to calculate aggregate supply. Agent i′s price and supply
estimates are thus given by the simultaneous solution of (22)-(23). In turn, he can choose
supply (21). We solve the model in Appendix E using a guess-and-verify approach.
These solutions yield two main insights. First, as in Proposition 1, multiple equilibria
exist due to the interaction between agents’ ability to forecast the equilibrium and aggre-
gate supply. Second, unlike the earlier model, where information was symmetric, we show
in Lemma 4 that output is depressed across all equilibria since agents systematically
underestimate demand if the true demand function is convex. Moreover, the marginal
cost of production differs among producers, and thus output, in addition to being low, is
produced inefficiently.
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4 Interpretations
In this section, we reinterpret our model in terms of the three macroeconomic workhorse
frameworks: (i) aggregate search models of the Diamond (1982) type, (ii) Life-cycle sav-
ings models of the Diamond (1965) type, and (iii) models of supply and demand as in
Samuelson (2009) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
1) Search: In the context of the Diamond (1982), p. 887, model, agents face the
following choice problem:
max
ai
{aiφ(A; b0)− f(ai)}, ai ∈ R+.
Where ai is individual i
′s output choice in Period 1, and φ(A; b0) is the probability with
which agents find a trading partner in Period 2. If a trading partner is found, agent i can
sell/exchange goods at price one. Finally, f(ai) is the cost of production.
The chance of finding a trading partner, φ(A; b0), is an increasing function in aggregate
economic activity A =
∫
[0,1]
aidi and government demand b. Diamond (1982) shows that
such an economy can have multiple REE equilibria, which we call, say, A0, A1. Suppose
now that agents know one of these REE, e.g., A0; then, if they are computationally
constrained, as in the present paper, they would need to use a polynomial expansion to
compute the probability φ(A0+∆A) of finding a trading partner that would prevail once
agents collectively deviate ∆A from producing A0. The same applies to the evaluation
of the exogenous policy parameter b, which may, unlike in Diamond (1982), result in a
negative multiplier effect, as discussed in Section 2.2.
2) Savings and Investment: In the context of the Diamond (1965) model, φ() may
be interpreted as a component to agents’ consumption savings problem:
max
st,c
1
t ,c
2
t+1
U(c1t , c
2
t+1) s.t. c
1
t = wt − st, c2t+1 = st(1 + rt+1), c1t > 0, c2t+1 > 0, (24)
where factor prices are functions of the prevailing capital-labor ratios kt and kt+1:
rt+1 = f
′(kt+1), wt = f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt.
To make choice (24), agents have to form expectations regarding equilibrium interest
rt+1 = f
′(kt+1). In equilibrium, the life-cycle savings condition, (1 + n)kt+1 = st, relates
savings and capital; n representing the exogenous rate of population growth.
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Suppose now that the economy is initially in a steady state at k0, s0. To compute
future interest rates, agents have to compute rt+1 = f
′(kt+1) = f
′( st
1+n
) =: φ(st;n). Once
again, if agents know the prevailing interest in the steady state, they have to engage in
polynomial expansions to form price expectations rˆt+1 to compute the interest rate that
obtains in the (temporary) equilibria that obtain once agents choose savings st = s0+∆st.
This argument extends to the case where agents supply labor in both periods. In that
case, to make their savings decision, agents have to (i) approximate the interest rate and
(ii) the second-period wage rate. That is, they have to approximate the Samuelson (1962)
neoclassical factor-price frontier, wt+1 = ξ(rt+1(kt+1(st))), which relates wages to interest,
interest to the capital intensity, and finally the capital intensity to savings.
3) Supply and Demand: Our lead interpretation was that of a simplified AD, AS
setting. Taking this perspective, we suggest one reason why demand analysis may be
computationally complicated for firms. Suppose demand is given by AD = ξ(A;L(A)),
where ξ represents demand, which is downward-sloping in supply ∂ξ
∂A
< 0. At the same
time, cuts in production A reduce employment L(A) and demand, i.e., ∂ξ
∂L
∂L
∂A
> 0. Ac-
cordingly, agents grapple with the question whether the function φ(A) := ξ(A;L(A)) is
upward or downward sloping once supply falls into regions which they do not know from
past experience.
Similarly, suppose that demand concerns a vector A ∈ RL of goods, involving sub-
stitutes and complements, as in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), pp. 599-641. Suppose that a
firm produces a particular good al, then, if all other firms in the economy, supplying the
various other goods, change their behavior, it has to analyze how changes in the supplies
and prices for the other goods L\ l, influence demand, and thus price, for good l. In turn,
if this firm is exceptionally well-informed, it might know the entries of the economy’s Ja-
cobian matrix. However, it need not know demand’s second- and cross-derivatives, which
once again makes it difficult to compute demand correctly.
5 Conclusion
Economists’ forecasting record suggests that it is difficult to compute future economic
events. The current model recognizes this and assumes that agents cannot compute exact
numeric values for future equilibrium outcomes such as prices.
The model’s key feature is that the precision with which agents can approximate fu-
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ture equilibrium prices depends on the level of aggregate economic activity, and is thus
endogenous. This interdependence between aggregate output and an individual firm’s
ability to forecast the price at which it can sell its output gives rise to equilibria in which
economic activity is inefficiently low. Such equilibria may be interpreted as “glitches” of
the overall economy. During such a glitch, agents collectively reduce economic activity.
This change in behavior makes it difficult to forecast the resulting equilibrium, which, in
turn, justifies the initial output cut. For similar reasons we also find that the scope for
government to correct such “glitches” in output is limited: Interventions, which would
unambiguously increase output in a frictionless economy, can make it harder for firms
to predict future equilibria and reduce output even further. Our model therefore cap-
tures the common place observation that large parameter changes, such as unprecedented
quantitative easing, can put agents into “uncharted territory”.
The particular form in which equilibria obtain depends on the assumption that agents
use the same Taylor-series expansions that an economic researcher, who applies standard
textbook methods, would use. More sophistication on the part of agents will undoubtedly
change the specific form and number of equilibria. However, it appears unlikely that the
precision with which future equilibrium outcomes are approximated can ever be entirely
independent of the overall level of economic activity, which is what our findings rely on.
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A Second-order Expansions
In this appendix, we derive our results for a setting where agents know of demand’s first
and second derivatives. They can thus use second-order expansions to estimate prices:
Pˆ = φ(A0) + φA∆A+
1
2
φAA∆A
2, (25)
We study the equilibria that emerge once agents are averse τ > 0 to the third-order error.
Setting τ = 0, we obtain the equilibria that emerge if agents are indifferent regarding
errors. Using the estimate (25), firms choose a profit-maximizing quantity:
a∗i = argmax
ai
{
pi = aiPˆ − 1
2
a2i − aiτ |∆A3|
}
, τ ≥ 0.
Individual and aggregate supply are thus
a∗i = Pˆ − τ |∆A|3, A =
∫
[0,1]
a∗idi = Pˆ − τ |∆A|3. (26)
Combining (25) and (26), we obtain:
A+ τ |∆A|3 = φ(A0) + φA∆A + 1
2
φAA∆A
2. (27)
Recalling that A0 = φ(A0), (27) writes:
τ |∆A|3 − 1
2
φAA∆A
2 + (1− φA)∆A = 0. (28)
If τ = 0 we have:
Proposition 2. If τ = 0, there exists the perfect foresight equilibrium ∆A0 = 0 and a
second equilibrium ∆A1 =
1−φA
1
2
φAA
.
According to Proposition 2, economic activity in the polynomial equilibrium exceeds
activity in the perfect foresight equilibrium if the demand function’s second derivative
indicates that demand may rebound 1
2
φAA > 0 once supply exceeds A0. A negative
second derivative 1
2
φAA depresses output in the same manner as the discount factor τ in
Proposition 1. As before, estimated demand can meet supply more than twice if agents
discount their price estimate:
Proposition 3. If τ > 0, there exist at least two equilibria: ∆A0 = 0, and ∆A1 =
− 1
4τ
φAA −
√
( 1
4τ
φAA)2 +
1−φA
τ
< 0, in which economic activity is depressed. If φAA > 0,
and ( 1
4τ
φAA)
2 > 1−φA
τ
, there may exist two additional equilibria where economic activity
is elevated ∆A2,3 =
1
4τ
φAA ±
√
( 1
4τ
φAA)2 − 1−φAτ > 0.
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Proof. Using (28), we find the perfect foresight equilibrium ∆A0 = 0. To identify the
remaining equilibria, we distinguish cases (i) ∆A < 0 and (ii) ∆A > 0.
1.) Assuming ∆A < 0: we note that |∆A3| = −∆A3. Dividing by ∆A, we find that
(28) has roots: ∆A1,2 = − 14τ φAA±
√
( 1
4τ
φAA)2 +
1−φA
τ
. However, only one root satisfies the
initial assumption ∆A < 0. That is, ∆A = − 1
4τ
φAA −
√
( 1
4τ
φAA)2 +
1−φA
τ
< 0, regardless
of the sign of φAA. The other root ∆A = − 14τ φAA +
√
( 1
4τ
φAA)2 +
1−φA
τ
> 0 is positive
since ( 1
4τ
φAA)
2 > 0, φA < 0,
1−φA
τ
> 0. It thus violates the initial assumption ∆A < 0.
2.) Assuming ∆A > 0: we note that |∆A3| = ∆A3 and find that (28) has two real
roots ∆A1,2 =
1
4τ
φAA ±
√
( 1
4τ
φAA)2 − 1−φAτ if ( 14τ φAA)2 > 1−φAτ . Both of these roots are
negative if φAA < 0 violating the assumption ∆A > 0. Hence, φAA > 0 is a sufficient
condition for ∆A > 0 equilibria to exist.
The polynomial equilibria in propositions 1-4 have in common that they originate from
a coordination problem: In their price forecasts, each agent takes the overall supply A
as given. In equilibrium, however, aggregate supply depends on agents’ price forecasts.
Hence, the price forecast itself is an equilibrium outcome. At this point, it is clear that
higher-order polynomials yield even more equilibria, and that propositions 1-4 carry over
qualitatively once we introduce demand Φ(A), for a vector A of goods.
B Alternative Discounting
The price estimate is as before:
Pˆ = φ0(A0, b0) + φA∆A+ φb∆b, ∆A = A− A0, ∆b = b− b0. (29)
The model differs in agents’ discounting:
pii = aiPˆ − aimax[∆A2,∆b2,∆A∆b]− 1
2
a2i
a∗i = Pˆ −max[∆A2,∆b2] (30)
According to (30) there are two regimes. First, agents fear that they miscalculate the
impact of the exogenous parameter change in case ∆b > ∆A. Second, agents fear that
they misjudge the other agents’ reaction to the exogenous parameter variation ∆A > ∆b.
To analyze the equilibrium outcomes associated with (29) and (30), we distinguish cases
where the parameter change is relatively large, |∆b| > |∆A|, from cases where its impact
is relatively small, |∆b| < |∆A|. Note that |∆A| is a function of |∆b|. That is, we start
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with the assumption that, e.g., |∆b| > |∆A| and solve for the equilibrium ∆A. In turn,
we check whether the initial assumption |∆b| > |∆A| is correct.
Proposition 4. If |φb−∆b
1−φA
| < 1, there exists only one equilibrium ∆A =
(
φb
1−φA
− ∆b
1−φA
)
∆b
in which |∆b| > |∆A|. In this equilibrium lim
b→b0
∆A
∆b
= φb
1−φA
= ∂A
∂b |A0,b0
.
Proof. Individual supply is ai = Pˆ −max[∆A2,∆b2] under the assumption that |∆b| >
|∆A|, we have ai = Pˆ − ∆b2. Aggregate supply is thus A =
∫
i∈[0,1]
ai = Pˆ − ∆b2.
Equilibrium requires A = A0+φA∆A+φb∆b−∆b2, respectively, ∆A(1−φA)+∆b(∆b−
φb) = 0. Solving yields ∆A =
φb−∆b
1−φA
∆b. It remains to note that |φb−∆b
1−φA
| < 1 ensures that
|∆b| > |∆A|.
As before, Proposition 4, ∆A =
(
φb
1−φA
− ∆b
1−φA
)
∆b, shows that agents extrapolate the
positive impact that a parameter change ∆A = φb
1−φA
. At the same time, they are facing
increased uncertainty as to the actual price at which their products sell ∆A = − ∆b
1−φA
∆b.
A large parameter change where ∆b > φb thus reduces economic activity as the uncertainty
that it creates outweighs the expansive effect φb > 0.
This leaves us with equilibria where agents are more concerned about the potential
error associated with aggregate supply changes. In these cases, agents are primarily afraid
that they forecast prices incorrectly due to the change ∆A. For cases where |∆b| < |∆A|
we have:
Proposition 5. There exists an upper bound ∆b1 > 0 and an equilibrium where ∆A1 =
−1
2
(1− φA)−
√
φb∆b+ (
1
2
(1− φA))2 < 0 and |∆b| < |∆A|, if ∆b ∈ [0,∆b1]. If φb1−φA > 1
there exists an upper bound ∆b2 > 0 and a second equilibrium ∆A2 = −12(1 − φA) +√
φb∆b+ (
1
2
(1− φA))2 > 0 where |∆b| < |∆A|, if ∆b ∈ [0,∆b2].
Proof. Individual supply is ai = Pˆ −max[∆A2,∆b2] under the assumption that |∆b| <
|∆A|, we have ai = Pˆ − ∆A2. Aggregate supply is thus AS =
∫
i∈[0,1]
ai = Pˆ − ∆A2.
Equilibrium requires AS = AD such that A = A0 + φA∆A + φb∆b − ∆A2, respectively,
∆A2+(1−φA)∆A+φb∆b = 0. Solving yields ∆A1,2 = −12(1−φA)±
√
φb∆b+ (
1
2
(1− φA))2.
Both roots are real since we assumed φb > 0 and ∆b > 0. It remains to specify the
conditions under which our initial hypothesis |∆b| < |∆A| holds. We start with ∆A1 =
−1
2
(1 − φA) −
√
φb∆b+ (
1
2
(1− φA))2 and note (i) ∆A1(∆b = 0) = −(1 − φA) such that
|∆b| = 0 < |∆A|, (ii) the derivative ∂∆A
∂∆b
=
−
φb
2√
φb∆b+(
1
2
(1−φA))2
vanishes as ∆b becomes
large. Taken together, (i) and (ii) imply that an upper bound ∆b1 exists, such that
|∆b| < |∆A| as long as ∆b ∈ [0,∆b1]. Similarly, regarding the second equilibrium ∆A2 =
−1
2
(1−φA)+
√
φb∆b+ (
1
2
(1− φA))2, we note that (i) ∆A2(∆b = 0) = 0 such that |∆b| =
|∆A| = 0, (ii) the derivative ∂∆A
∂∆b
=
φb
2√
φb∆b+(
1
2
(1−φA))2
=|∆b=0
φb
(1−φA)
and lim
∆b→∞
∂∆A
∂∆b
=
lim
∆b→∞
φb
2√
φb∆b+(
1
2
(1−φA))2
= 0. Taken together, (i) and (ii) imply that if φb
1−φA
> 1 there
exists an upper bound ∆b2 such that |∆b| < |∆A| as long as ∆b ∈ [0,∆b2].
The first equilibrium in Proposition 5 corresponds to the perfect foresight equilibrium,
∆A = 0 of Proposition 1: In the limit, where the parameter change becomes infinitesimally
small, we obtain ∆A = 0. In this equilibrium, increases in b indeed increase equilibrium
supply provided that these increases are small such that ∆b < ∆b1 < ∆b2. In the second
equilibrium, which corresponds to the crisis equilibrium in Proposition 1, output is strictly
decreasing in b.
Taken together, Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that bold interventions by the govern-
ment tend to reduce economic activity as such changes make it more difficult for agents to
forecast prices. Moreover, in the crisis equilibrium ∆A2, government interventions, which
would increase output were there no computational frictions, always reduce income.
C Learning The REE
We have shown that agents can learn the A0 equilibrium if (i) demand is convex and (ii)
agents always coordinate on the “+” equilibrium. We now show that agents also learn
the REE if (i) demand is not convex, and (ii) when agents, e.g., alternate between playing
the “+” and “-” root equilibria.
We write the equilibrium condition as:
A− φ(A∗) = φA(A∗)(A−A∗)− (A−A∗)2. (31)
The left-hand side of (31) represents the difference between supply and demand in an
equilibrium where agents use their knowledge of A∗, φ(A∗) to estimate the price. This
difference is 0 in the perfect foresight equilibrium where A0 = φ(A0). Regarding the
right-hand side, we define ε = (A−A∗), which yields
A− φ(A∗) = φAε− ε2, (32)
over time as agents observe an increasing number of price quantity pairs {φ(At), At}Tt=0.
The distance ε = (A − A∗) between the aggregate supply A and the point of estimation
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A∗ will go to zero.16 Hence, from (32) we have lim
ε→0
(A − φ(A∗)) = 0. However, the only
point where A = φ(A) is A0, the perfect foresight equilibrium quantity. Hence, as agents
learn more data on demand, they eventually move towards the efficient equilibrium.
D Asymmetric Equilibria
Agents using φ(A∗) to think about a deviation from A∗, might choose a quantity A(A∗)
which is closer to A∗∗ than to A∗. Thus, to forecast the selling price φ(A(A∗)), they would
rather use A∗∗ as the point of departure. In turn, once agents use A∗∗ they might choose
a supply A(A∗∗), which, however, is again closer to A∗ than A∗∗. Thus, given (17), agents
would switch back to A∗, and so forth:
|A(A∗)− A∗| > |A(A∗)−A∗∗| (33)
|A(A∗∗)−A∗∗| > |A(A∗∗)−A∗|. (34)
In such a situation, there exists no symmetric equilibrium between points A∗ and A∗∗.
Instead, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which a mass ψ ∈ (0, 1) of agents use
A∗ and a mass 1− ψ use A∗∗.
It follows from (17) that agents are only indifferent between using A∗ and A∗∗ if the
equilibrium quantity A satisfies A = A
∗+A∗∗
2
. That is, agents see A∗ and A∗∗ as equally
informative once the supply they want to learn about is equally distant from both points.
To establish the existence of an equilibrium we have to prove that there exist shares ψ
and 1−ψ for which the equilibrium supply Aψψ+A1−ψ(1−ψ) indeed equals A¯ = A∗+A∗∗2 .
16To see this note that, given our assumptions on φ(), all real-valued equilibrium supplies, (20), fall
into a compact interval [0, Aˆ]. In turn, the sequence of equilibrium supplies {At}Tt=0, for which agents
know demand, partitions this interval. As time progresses, this partition becomes finer and finer. That
is, if we order the quantities At such that Al < Al+1, l = 1, 2, 3...T , the interval between Al and Al+1
is either filled with new equilibria, or, if there exist no equilibria between them, economic activity takes
place elsewhere on the interval [0, Aˆ]. Finally, we note that agents using A∗ to think about a deviation
from A∗, might choose a quantity A(A∗) which is closer to A∗∗ than to A∗. Thus, to forecast the selling
price φ(A(A∗)), agents would rather use A∗∗ as the point of approximation. In turn, once agents use
A∗∗ they might choose a supply A(A∗∗), which, however, is again closer to A∗ than A∗∗. Thus agents
would switch back to A∗, and so on. In such situations, there exists no symmetric equilibrium between
points A∗ and A∗∗. Instead, Appendix D shows that there does exist an asymmetric equilibrium, where
a fraction ψ of the agents uses point A∗ and the remaining fraction 1 − ψ uses point A∗∗, resulting in
equilibrium supply A = A
∗
+A∗∗
2
.
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Once we denote the equilibrium supply by A(ψ) = ψA(A∗, A(ψ))+(1−ψ)A(A∗∗, A(ψ)),
we can write the equations that determine equilibrium as
A(ψ) = A¯ A¯ :=
A∗ + A∗∗
2
(35)
A(ψ) := ψAψ(A
∗, A(ψ)) + (1− ψ)A1−ψ(A∗∗, A(ψ)) (36)
Aψ(A
∗, A(ψ)) = Pˆψ − (A(ψ)− A∗) Aψ(A∗∗, A(ψ)) = Pˆ1−ψ − (A(ψ)− A∗∗)(37)
Pˆψ = φ(A
∗) + φA(A
∗)(A(ψ)− A∗) (38)
Pˆ1−ψ = φ(A
∗∗) + φA(A
∗∗)(A(ψ)− A∗∗) (39)
Solving (36)-(39) for supply A(ψ) yields:
A(ψ) = −p
2
±
√
−q + (p
2
)2
−q = ψφ(A∗) + (1− ψ)φ(A∗∗)− ψφA(A∗)− (1− ψ)φAA∗∗ − ψ(A∗)2 − (1− ψ)(A∗∗)2
p = 1 + 2ψA∗ + 2(1− ψ)A∗∗ − ψφA(A∗)− (1− ψ)φA(A∗∗) > 0
Given our assumption that supply is downward-sloping, we have −p < 0. Hence, there is
only one real root A(ψ) = −p
2
+
√−q + (p
2
)2 with positive supply. Note in particular that
A(ψ = 0) (A(ψ = 1)) is the supply when all agents use A∗ (A∗∗) as the point of reasoning.
By our initial hypothesis (33)-(34), we have A(ψ = 0) > A¯ and A(ψ = 1) < A¯. Hence,
there exists an intermediate value ψ˜, at which A(ψ˜) = A¯, if
√−q + (p
2
)2 as required by
the indifference condition (35).17
E Asymmetric Information Equilibria
We solve the model in two steps. First, we guess the equilibrium outcome. Given this
guess, we solve the estimation problem for agent i. Second, we solve for the equilibrium
and verify our guess.
4) Problem of an individual agent: To find the optimal supply of an individual
agent, we must solve (22)-(23). To do so, we start with the guess that agent i beliefs
that agents j hold the same believe over aggregate supply that he holds himself, i.e.,
Aˆ|Ai = (Aˆ|Aj)|Ai = Aˆ. Given this guess, we show that:
Pˆ |Ai = (Pˆ |Aj)|Ai. (40)
17The root
√−q + (p
2
)2 is never complex as ψ runs from 0 to 1. To see this we recall −q(ψ = 0) > 0,
−q(ψ = 1) > 0 and that the derivative ∂−q
∂ψ
is not a function of ψ itself and thus cannot change signs as
ψ varies. Accordingly, −q > 0∀ψ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, √−q + (p
2
)2 is always real.
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Put differently, equation (40) means that agent i believes that agents j observe points,
which lie on his estimated demand curve. That is, agent i knows that agent j estimates
the price as
Pˆ |Aj = φ(Aj) + φA(Aj)(Aˆ|Aj − Aj),
and thus i estimates Pˆ |Aj as:
(Pˆ |Aj)|Ai = φ(Aj)|Ai + φA(Aj)|Ai((Aˆ|Aj)|Ai −Aj), (41)
where
φ(Aj)|Ai = φ(Ai) + φA(Ai)(Aj − Ai), (42)
φA(Aj)|Ai = φA(Ai), Aˆ|Ai = (Aˆ|Aj)|Ai = Aˆ. (43)
Taken together, (41)-(43) mean that agent i uses polynomials to approximate the demand
curve upon which the other player observes a point Aj , φ(Aj), φA(Aj). Using (42)-(43),
(41) rewrites:
(Pˆ |Aj)|Ai = φ(Ai) + φA(Ai)(Aj −Ai) + φA(Ai)(Aˆ− Aj),
= φ(Ai) + φA(Ai)(Aˆ|Ai − Ai) =|(22) Pˆ |Ai.
Agent i thus believes that agent j will work with a price estimate that is identical to the
one he uses himself and thus he will conclude that j′s supply forecast is identical to his
own, such that Aˆ|Ai = (Aˆ|Aj)|Ai = Aˆ, which confirms our initial guess. It remains to
solve (22)-(23) for player i′s forecast in the two equilibria A1,2:
Aˆ1,2|Ai = Ai − 1− φA(Ai)
2
±
√
(φ(Ai)−Ai) +
(1− φA(Ai)
2
)2
,
ai = Pˆ |Ai − (Aˆ|Ai − Ai)2
= φ(Ai) + φA(Ai)(Aˆ|Ai − Ai)− (Aˆ|Ai −Ai)2 (44)
ai;1,2 = φ(Ai) + φA(Ai)
(
− 1− φA(Ai)
2
±
√
(φ(Ai)− Ai) +
(1− φA(Ai)
2
)2)
−
(
− 1− φA(Ai)
2
±
√
(φ(Ai)−Ai) +
(1− φA(Ai)
2
)2)2
. (45)
5) Equilibrium: From (45) we calculate equilibrium supply as:
A1,2 =
∫
[0,1]
a1,2(Ai)f(Ai)di. (46)
Concerning the equilibrium quantity Ak, k = 1, 2, we note
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Lemma 4. If demand φ is quasi-convex, then equilibrium output across both equilibria
Ak, k = 1, 2 falls short of efficient output A0.
Proof. To compare equilibrium output (46) to efficient output A0, we recall that A0 =
φ(A0). We also recall that, for convex functions f , we have f
′(u) ≤ f(v)−f(u)
v−u
. In the
current context, this means that agents tend to underestimate convex demand functions:
φ(Ai) + φA(Ai)(A− Ai) ≤ φ(A)
recalling (44) we have:
ai = φ(Ai) + φA(Ai)(Aˆ|Ai −Ai)− (Aˆ|Ai −Ai)2 ≤ φ(A0)− (Aˆ|Ai −Ai)2 ≤ φ(A0) = A0.
Put differently, agents supply less than the efficient quantity since (i) they underestimate
demand and (ii) since they know that their price estimate is inaccurate.
The equilibria in (46), feature two sources of inefficiency. First, aggregate output falls
short of the efficient level A0. Second, since price estimates vary, output and the marginal
cost of output differ across firms. Aggregate output is thus produced inefficiently.
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